Romantic "Kunstkritik" and "Messianische" Historiography:

by Norman Friesen: (nfriesen@gpu.srv.ualberta.ca)

In the introduction to his 1919 dissertation, Der Begriff der Kunstkritik in der deutschen Romantik, Benjamin describes his intention as follows: "[D]ie romantische Theorie der Kunstkritik," Benjamin proposes, "soll nach den romantischen Theoretikern der Kunst systematisch dargestellt werden."[1] Within this same introductory section, Benjamin also discusses the programmatic limitations of his inquiry --"die Einschränkungen der Fragestellung"[2]-- which are to assist in further defining the purpose and scope of the dissertation. One of the most significant limitations identified here is the exclusion of what Benjamin labels the "Gesichtsphilosophie" implicated in the concept of romantic "Kunstkritik:"

Es wird in ihr [(der Dissertation)] nicht der...Versuch gemacht, das historische Wesen der Romantik darzustell- en; mit anderen Worten: die geschichtsphilosophische Fragestellung bleibt aus dem Spiel"(12).

Benjamin continues by restating the purpose and scope of his dissertation as it appears in view of this essential stipulation. He states specifically that his dissertation will present the textual evidence for the romantic "Kunsttheorie," but will not to discuss this theory's underlying "standpoint." (Benjamin also indicates at this point that his dissertation will focus most specifically on Friedrich Schlegel's contribution to this theory):

[D]ie folgenden Aufstellungen...werden...besonders hinsichtlich der eigentümlichen Systematik von Fried- rich Schlegels Denken und der frühromantischen Idee der Kunst, auch für eine Wesensbestimmung Materialien --nicht aber den Gesichtspunkt-- beibringen (12).[

Significantly, in his correspondence written roughly at the same time as the composition of the dissertation, Benjamin speaks explicitly and emphatically of this "messianism." At one point in this correspondence, he describes it as "das Zentrum der Romantik" --as constitutive of "die...unbekannte wahre Natur der Roman-

tik"-- which, as he goes on to say, can be treated his dissertation only in the form of "ein...mittelbar[er] Hinweis."[5] At another point, Benjamin explains that what he had actually learned through the composition of the dissertation was "nämlich einen Einblick in das Verhältnis einer Wahrheit zur Geschichte;" and he concedes that this insight "wird allerdings darin am wenigsten ausgesprochen sein, aber hoffentlich für kluge Leser bemerkbar."[6] In this same vein (and in the letter cited previously), Benjamin also remarks enigmatically that what he wishes "in dieser Arbeit erreicht [zu] haben [ist,] daß man diesen Sachverhalt von innen heraus ihr entnehmen könne."[7]

It is the intention of this paper to attempt precisely to "in-fer" or "recouperate" this hidden messianic "Sachverhalt;" to make explicit the theme of "romantischer Messianismus" which --although implicated in "der Begriff der Kunstkritik" itself-- is presented only elliptically or implicitly in Benjamin's dissertation. This paper will begin with an attentive reading of the explicit, denotative content of the dissertation, with the hope of eventually teasing out from it the messianic theme connoted within it. It will then conclude by briefly attempting to ramify this early, implicit conception of the messianic through reference to a subsequent, explicit articulation of a messianic "Geschichts-philosophie" developed in Benjamin's "Thesen" "Über den Begriff der Geschichte."

*       *       *

In his dissertation's introductory section --immediately after delineating the scope and purpose of his investigation-- Benjamin focuses specifically on the nature and importance of the "epistemological presuppositions" which he describes as underlying the romantic theory of "Kunstkritik:" "[Die] Theorie der Kunst ist auf das entscheidenste auf erkenntnistheoretischen Voraussetzung fundiert"(15). "[D]ie Darstellung jener [vorausgesetzten] Erkenntnis-theorie," as Benjamin goes on to say, "[ist f]ür das Verständnis d[ies]es Kritikbegriffs...unerläßlich(16). Benjamin subsequently asserts that this crucial "erkenntnistheoretische Grundkonzeption" is identifiable specifically as "der Grundbegriff der Reflexion"(16) --a conception of self-conscious, subjective reflection whose origin he attributes to Johann Gottlieb Fichte: "Das im Selbstbewußtsein über sich selbst reflektierende Denken ist die Grundtatsache," according to Benjamin, "von der [diese] [E]rkenntnistheor[ie] ausgeh[t]"(18). And as such, it can be said to mark, as Benjamin describes it, the "Übereinstimmung der Frühromantiker mit Fichtes Position"(20).

In the body of his dissertation proper --which is introduced directly after the prefatory remarks cited just above-- Benjamin discusses the Fichtean "Grundbegriff der Reflexion" in greater detail, and shows explicitly how the "romantische Begriff der Kunstkritik" is derived from this conceptual fundament. Accordingly, this paper's reading of the explicit content of the dissertation will commence by itself retracing Benjamin's account of this process of derivation: It will begin with an examination of the epistemological presuppositions obtained from Fichte's "Reflexionsphilosophie," and will then proceed to examine the evolution of "Kunstkritik" from this epistemology.

The presuppositional, broadly Fichtean "Grundbegriff der Reflexion" can itself perhaps be most effectively examined by considering in some detail Benjamin's description of the fundamental, initial steps or acts implied in the process of "Reflexion." The first of these steps --or the first act of "[das] über sich selbst reflektierende Denken"-- is designated by Benjamin simply as "das bloße Denken"(27). Benjamin's description of this form of "Denken," it must be noted, is articulated specifically in terms of the relation of this "thinking" to the particular object or subject matter to which it is directed: "Das bloße Denken," as Benjamin explains, "ist ein Denken von etwas...ist dem Gedachten gegenüber Form...und [es] soll...die erste Relfexionsstufe [gennant werden]"(27). At the level of this initial "bloße Denken," thought can be understood as relating to or "thinking" its given subject-matter specifically by abstracting from it a particular "Form." This form, in turn, can perhaps be best understood as representing certain abstract qualities or properties which are themselves derived or abstracted --and in this sense "formalized"-- from the object. And these properties should themselves be understood as being thus abstracted and formalized to the point where they become so abstract as to be applicable to all objects similarly comprehended by thought. These properties or qualities --which (for example) might be identifiable as the object's extension in space, its color or density-- could thus be said to present an ideal, universal "form" which would acquire actuality and particularity only by being assigned a given "content." This content (constituted, for example, by specific determinations for this extension, color, density, etc.) must itself be understood as being effectively nullified or overcome through its abstraction and formalization. As such, this reflective stage can be described as achieving both the positive definition an essential form, and also as the negation of given content correlative to it.

The second stage of this process --which is designated simply as "d[ie] zweit[e] Stufe...der Reflexion," or "[das] zweit[e] Denken"-- is characterized by Benjamin specifically as "d[as] Denken jenes ersten Denkens"(27, 28): At this stage, reflective thought must be understood as being directed reflexively upon itself; as finding its object, subject-matter, or content in the form abstracted in the first stage of reflection; and as abstracting from this objectified or "substantivized" form a second and new form: "Die Reflexion im Sinne der Romantiker," as Benjamin explains, "ist Denken, das seine Form erzeugt; [i]m zweiten Denken," he continues, "kehrt in der Tat das erste Denken verwandelt auf höherer Stufe wieder"(27, emphasis added). Like the form abstracted at the first stage of reflection, this second form must be understood as also being "formalized" to the point where it would be applicable to any and all thoughts similarly compre-hended, objectified and reflected by thought. Also, this formal-ization --like that occurring in the first "Reflexionsstufe"-- must be understood as achieving the positive definition of this abstract form through the negation of its particular content. It is in this way that this second reflection should be understood as producing, as Benjamin indicates, a "höh[ere] Deutlichkeit...und Klarheit"(31-32).

After thus describing this "zweite Relfexionsstufe," Benjamin goes on to underscore the fact that this second stage --in relating thought self-reflexively with itself-- can be seen as being paradigmatic of all subsequent stages of reflection: "Die eigentliche Reflexion in ihrer vollen Bedeutung entsteht jedoch erst auf der zweiten Stufe, in dem Denken jenes ersten Denkens"(28). "Die erkennnistheoretisch maßgebende Form des Denkens," as Benjamin continues, "ist also...diese Form...d[es] Denken[s] des Denkens"(28). After attaining this definitive self-reflexive "form," the process of reflective thought must be understood as repeating its self-reflexive function of self-formalization indefinitely and infinitely[8] --forming, as Benjamin states "[das] Denken des Denken des Denkens und so fort..."(26, 30-31). In this way, reflective thought can be described as constituting an unending "Steigerung, Potenzierung der Reflexion" (57) --a progression which is not simply cumulative and linear in fashion, but which must be understood as developing exponentially:[9] It must be conceived, in other words, as forming a succession of reflections of ever "höher[e] Klarheit und Deutlichkeit," which would approach asymptotically[10] a moment of absolute reflection, of total clarity and intelligibility. Benjamin ends his description of the stages of this reflective process with the following conclusion:

[D]ieses Denken des Denkens...bildet für die Frühroman- tiker die Grundform alles intuitiven Erkennens und erhält so seine Dignität als Methode; es befaßt als Erkennen des Denkens jede andere, niedere Erkenntnis unter sich...(28).

It is this process of infinite, self-reflexive formalization and abstraction, then, which can thus be understood as constituting the "erkenntnistheoretische Grundkonzeption" derived from the Fichtean "Reflexionsbegriff." Given this fact, it is possible to now retrace Benjamin's description of the derivation of romantic "Kunstkritik" from this suppositional epistemology. Such a task can perhaps be best carried out by briefly noting a number of significant conceptual displacements occurring throughout the first two-thirds of Benjamin's "systematische Darstellung" of "Kunstkritik." In the case of each of these displacements, that which is identified as the underlying agency or center of reflection can be said to be substituted or supplanted by a center or agency of a different nature. In this way, that which was originally identified (at least implicitly) as the agency of reflective abstraction and formalization --idealist "Denken" or the Fichtean "Ich"-- is gradually transformed, ultimately to be redefined as the romantic "Kunstwerk" and its specific "Form."

To focus briefly on two essential instances of such redefinition and displacement, one could first note that half way through the first part of the dissertation, Benjamin asserts the following: "Die romantische Kunstanschauung beruht darauf, daß im [reflektierenden] Denken des Denkens kein Ich-Bewußtsein verstanden wird"(39, 40); but instead, the "Mittelpunkt" of this "Reflexion" is to be understood as being "die Kunst, [und] nicht das Ich"(39). At a second point --towards the end of the dissertation's latter half-- Benjamin specifically identifies the agency of this "Ich-freie Relfexion"(40) as being not simply "Kunst," but rather, the form of the artwork or of the work itself: "[D]as Organ der künstlerischen Reflexion" Benjamin states apodictically, "ist...die Form"(87).

By thus supplanting "Kunst" for "das Ich" --and then indicating that this notion of "Kunst" can be substituted with that of its specific "Form"-- Benjamin reveals the derivation of romantic "Kunstkritik" from its underlying "Reflexionsbegriff" essentially as occurring through the substitution of one paradigm by another: Specifically, it can be described as the substitution of the subjective, idealist paradigm of "das Ich" and "Denken" with that of the romantic "Kunstwerk" and its objective "Form." Correlative to this central substitution or displacement must be understood to occur a series of lesser terminological displacements: For the particular terms describing the process of reflection must themselves be transposed from the vocabulary of idealist epistemology to what would be their formal, objective analogues in terminology of romantic "Kunstkritik." Through such a transposition, reflection can be described not as applying to the abstract form of thought or cognition, but --as Benjamin indicates-- exclusively to the artwork and its formal dimension:

Ganz analog zu dem Gedanken, mit welchem...Fichte die Reflexion an der bloßen Form der Erkenntnis sich mani- festieren sieht...bekundet den Romantikern das reine Wesen der Reflexion sich an der rein formalen Erschein- ung des Kunstwerks(72).

One specific terminological transposition of cardinal importance can be identified in terms of what was earlier designated as the first stage of idealist "Denken" or "Reflexion." This specific aspect or moment in the reflexive process --in which form is abstracted from the substance of a given object-- can be said to find its objective analogue in what Benjamin designates as "bestimmte Reflexion." Benjamin describes this particular, "formal" mode of reflection as working to form ("bilden") "[die] Individualität und Form des Kunstwerks"(73). His further remarks indicate that this reflection accomplishes such an "individuation" and "formation" precisely through the definition and delimitation of reflection itself: Benjamin speaks specifically of a "Selbstbeschränkung der Reflexion;" and he goes on to make the significant claim that "[d]iese... Selbstbeschränkung" works to achieve or produce ("leisten") that which he designates as "die Darstellungsform des Werkes"(74-75). Benjamin defines this "Darstellungsform" specifically "als die relative, bestimmte ...empirische...Form des einzelnen Werkes," and his descriptions repeatedly underscore the fundamental importance of this form and of the first, "bestimmte" reflection through which it is defined.[11]

Immediately after ascribing "Selbsbeschränkung" to the "iso-lierte," "bestimmte" reflection of the "erste Reflexionsstufe," Benjamin defines the ultimate "Aufgabe d[er] Kritik" as being the "Aufhebung" of all such forms of limitation, "Beschränkung" and "Begrenzung"(73).[12] In making this claim, Benjamin can be said to identify the essential function of what would be the objective ana-log of the second "Reflexionsstufe" of idealist reflection. As described earlier, this "second" reflection --which is to take the result of the first as its object, and abstract form from its substance-- can be said to result in the supersession and negation of the first "Relfexionsstufe." It is precisely this destructive result or moment that Benjamin can be said to consistently highlight in his description of this second stage of objective reflection. Although Benjamin (it should be noted) does not explicitly identify this destructive moment as forming a second "Reflexionsstufe," he repeatedly underscores the specific function of the "[Ü]berwind[ung] d[er] Begrenztheit [d]er Darstellungsform" (91) --or (as he phrases it elsewhere) as "[die] Auflösung...der positiv formalen Momenten des Werkes"(77, 78). Additionally, it should be noted that Benjamin further describes this destructive process as being even tantamount to the complete eradication of the work itself: "Die Kritik," as he states unequivocally, "opfert[,] zerstört [und z]ersetz[t]...das Werk gänzlich"(85, 86).

Benjamin's emphatic insistence on this dissolution of the individual work (as well as his failure to designate this moment explicitly as second reflection) can be said to be motivated by an important distinction --a specifically qualitative distinction which would separate the second objective "Reflexionsstufe" from the first. This underlying difference (which is also closely connected with the aforementioned paradigmatic nature of the second "Denken des Denkens") can be explained as follows: In the second "Relfexionsstufe," it is important to note that the object or content upon which reflection acts is necessarily already the product of a previous reflection. The form which would be abstracted from this content by the second reflection would be descriptive not of something outside of reflection, but only of objective reflection (or of idealist "Denken") itself. As a result, the second (and also all subsequent stages) of reflection must be understood as moving definitively beyond any relation to an object, form, or "Werk" which is external to reflection. It must be understood, in other words as always reflecting and abstracting form from that which is already reflected and formalized.

Furthermore, if form is itself to be understood as constituting the "Organ" or agency of this formalization and reflection (as Benjamin's aforementioned remark indicates),[13] then this continuing reflective process must be understood as being carried out only through the agency of form and reflection themselves. The formalization of form is performed, as such, by form itself. Because reflection can thus be said to relate to nothing but form --and to constitute this relation through nothing but form itself-- it can be said to constitute a process of self-relation which is also self-mediated, and in this sense, always purely immanent to itself. In this way, reflection can be further characterized as being constituted by an unbroken order of an infinite number of such immanent, self-mediated self-relations.[14]

Benjamin can be said to designate this continuity of self-mediated self-relation as a "Medium" or --as he later designates it-- a "Kontinuum."[15] And --referring to it throughout his dissertation-- he designates it variously as a "Medium der Reflexion"(58, 60, 73), "Reflexionsmedium der Formen"(87), "Medium der Kunst"(40, 68) or "[eine] erfüll[t]e...Kontinuum der Formen" (87, 88). Also, because this medium constitutes that space within which the process of reflection is to develop not in a merely linear manner, but to evolve exponentially --up to the point of absolute "Potenzierung"-- Benjamin characterizes this medium as being itself absolute: He describes it, for example, as "ein absoluter Relfexionsmedium"(44), "[ein] sich selbst reflexiv[es] Absolutum"(31) or --emphasizing the "Form" or "Kunstform" to which this reflection remains immanent-- as an "absolute" or "Universal-werk."[16] (Additionally, it should be noted that Benjamin also describes this absolute as being ultimately coeval with what he designates as the "Idee der Kunst" itself.[17])

Given the fact that it is only with the second reflection that the work of art becomes a part of this absolute medium, the reason for Benjamin's insistence on the primarily destructive or "auflösende" function of this reflection now becomes apparent: For it is precisely through the supersession and nullification of the work's individual, empirical "Darstellungsform" accomplished at this point that it becomes possible for the "Kunstwerk" to be in fact "aufgelöst" or incorporated into the "Reflexionsmedium." As a result, the "Auflösung" which Benjamin emphasizes appears not as purely destructive, but can be said to present the dissolution only of the artwork's the specificity and individuality in order that it may enter into the unbroken plenum or unity of the medium: Benjamin himself speaks, for example, of a "kritische Auflösung ...der positiv formalen Momenten des Werkes...auf ihren Zusammenhang...im Medium"(73, 77); and he describes also how the process of "Kritik unwiderruflich und ernsthaft die Form auflöst, um das einzelne Werk ins absolute Kunstwerk zu verwandeln"(84).

Given such characterizations --along with the related explanations and descriptions provided above-- the general process of "Kritik" can be said to appear as a process of "formal" reflection in which the "Kunstwerk" is made to undergo a series of transformations: The artwork is first defined in its particularity as an individuated "Darstellungsform;" subsequently, it is trans-ferred or "aufgelöst" into an absolute "Medium" of self-related form; and --through an endless process of further reflective "Potenzierungen"-- this form is finally made to progress towards an ever closer proximity to or congruence with the "absolute Kunstform."[18] This general process of "Kunstkritik" can in other words be said to appear as a "reflexion im Medium der Kunst" through which the individuated artwork is defined, "medially" encompassed, and finally united in an absolute whole --in a totalized "Universalwerk." Referring specifically to Schlegel's particular notions of "Gattung" and "Poesie" --and emphasizing the objective nature of the critical process-- Benjamin summarizes the function of "kritische Reflexion" as follows:

die Reflexion ist nicht...ein subjektiv reflektier- endes Verhalten, sondern sie liegt in der Darstell- ungsform des Werkes eingeschlossen, entfaltet sich in der Kritik um sich endlich im gesetzmäßigen Kontinuum der Formen zu erfüllen. [Dieses Verfahren] wird in im 116. Athenäumsfragment als Bestimmung der romantisch- en Poesie bezeichnet, "alle getrennten Gattungen der Poesie wieder zu veriningen...Sie umfaßt alles, was nur poetisch ist, vom größten wieder mehrere Systeme in sich enthaltende Systeme der Kunst..."(88).

After having thus presented the rudimentary aspects of the "frühromantische Begriff der Kunstkritik" in their formalized objectivity, Benjamin goes on to consider the "Schlegel[sche] Ironiebegriff" in similarly formal, objective terms. Indicating first of all that this irony can be explained only in the context of the specifically "objektiven Momenten" in Schlegel's theory,[19] Benjamin begins this explanation by distinguishing between two essential forms of Schlegelian or romantic irony: "Für die Kunstkritik," as he explains, "hat der Ironiebegriff eine doppelte Bedeutung;"(82) and he characterizes the first of these only very briefly as a "negativ[e]" and "subjektiv[e] Ironie des Stoffes"(85). He also indicates that this first type of irony must be understood specifically in terms of "[d]ie Willkür des wahren Dichters, die...bewußt und pielerisch waltet[, und] ihren Spielraum allein im Stoff hat"(83). Significantly, Benjamin further remarks that "allein ist dieser [Begriff der Ironie] bisher in der Literatur über die Romantik aufgefaßt..."(82)

Benjamin proceeds to describe the second "Ironiebegriff" in diametric opposition to the first; and he characterizes it as "die [Ironie] der Form[, nicht] des Stoffes, stating also that it must be understood as being "[nicht] negativ und subjektiv, [sondern] positiv und objektiv dagegen"(87, 85). Benjamin also inidcates that this irony --in implicit opposition to its subjective counter-part-- has been largely neglected in scholarship; and he attempts to offset this deficiency by describing it in some depth. This paper will itself delineate this description at some length --not only because this "Ironiebegriff" constitutes an intrinsic part of "Kunstkritik," but also because it proves to be crucial for understanding the dissertation's implicit messianic theme.

Despite Benjamin's identification of its positive nature, he initially describes this objective irony in terms of its destructive function or potential: He characterizes it simply as irony, "[die] über die Einheit der dichterischen Form sich hinwegsetzt"(83), or "die in [d]er freiwilligen Zerstörung...der Form...besteht"(84). It should be noted that to these two straightforward characterizations, Benjamin also adds that this irony must be understood as unfolding or presenting itself within the context of the medium of reflection: "Diese Form der Ironie...wie die Kritik...kann..sich nur in der Reflexion darstellen;"(85) and as such, he notes that this irony "zeigt eine auffallende Verwandtschaft mit der Kritik."(84)

At the same time, however, Benjamin also maintains that formal irony --despite its destructive function-- is characterized by "eine eigentümliche Positivität"(85). It is this "Positivität," as Benjamin continues to explain, which represents the "unterscheidendes Merkmal" of this irony "von der ebenfalls objektiv gerichteten Kritik"(85-6). Benjamin proceeds to delineate the "Unterscheidung" or differentiation of this allegedly positive irony from "Kritik" in the following way: Whereas "Kritik" "das Werk gänzlich... opfert," Benjamin emphasizes that irony "[z]erstör[t] allein...d[ie] bestimmte Darstellungform" of the artwork; the negativity of this irony applies, as he indicates later, only to "die Illusion in der Kunstform"(86, 106). Benjamin goes on to identify that aspect of the work which is "erhält" in irony specifically as being "die Unzerstörbarkeit des Werkes"(86), or the "unzerstörbar[e] Kern des Werkes"(106).

Thus, according to Benjamin's remarks, it can be surmised that through the destruction of the artwork in its illusory, individual "Darstellungsform," formal irony can be said to isolate and preserve an indestructible element or nucleus which is inherent to the artwork. Benjamin himself can be said to describe this paradoxical process of destruction and preservation in the following way:

Die formale Ironie...stellt den paradoxen Versuch dar, am Gebilde noch durch Abbruch zu bauen.... Sie zer- stört nicht allein das Werk nicht, das sie angreift, sondern sie nähert es selbst der Unzerstörbarkeit(87, 86).

In his further description of the way in which formal irony defines the "indestructibility" of each work, Benjamin can be said to underscore the fact that through this act of preservation, this irony works to accomplish something which is not achieved at any single moment in the critical reflective process. Specifically, Benjamin asserts that this paradoxical process of destruction and preservation works to bring the specific "Einzelwerk" (in its concrete particularity) into relation to the absolute or "Idee der Kunst"(86) (in its universal generality) Benjamin describes this remarkable result in the following passage:

Durch die...Erhaltung des Werkes [und die] Zerstörung [sein]er bestimmten Darstellungsform...wird die relative Einheit des Einzelwerkes tiefer in die der Kunst als des Universalwerkes zurückgestoßen, sie wird, ohne verloren zu gehen, völlig auf diese bezogen"(86).

This irony, in other words --by isolating the artwork's "Unzerstörbarkeit"-- can be said to bring to light the affinity or consanguity which would link the individual work of art with the absolute or "Idee" of art itself.

This remarkable capacity of formal irony to thus bring these two extremes into relation can said to be properly understood only in terms of the process of objective reflection described at length above. In order to explain this capacity in these terms, it is first important to recall from the above explanation that the two extremes linked by irony (the individual "Darstellungform," and the universal "Absolute") must be understood as constituting the very first and last stages in the reflective process constitutive of criticism: The first, of course, would be the "erste Reflexionsstufe" in which the individual "Darstellungsform" of the artwork is defined. The other (which, in an infinitude of reflec-tion, can be spoken of only hypothetically[20]) would be what Benjamin designates at one point as "absolute Reflexion" --the reflection in which absolute "Klarheit" or the "absolute Kunstwerk" is attained.[21] It is also important to note that --according to the explanation presented above-- this latter, absolute reflection must be understood as deriving its content exclusively from that originally abstracted and formalized in the "erste Reflexions-stufe:" For the content formalized in any given reflection is always constituted by that which was abstracted in the previous stage. Consequently, it follows that there cannot enter into this content anything that is not already present (at least potentially) already in the first reflection. When this process is understood in this way, it becomes clear that the form produced in the final, absolute reflection can be described as originally existing in its potentiality in the artwork from the start; and it is this potentiality --existing in some manner throughout the course of the process of reflection-- which could be said to form that within the artwork which is ultimately not destroyed through reflection

--its "unzerstörbare Kern." However, in the sense that critical reflection was described as totally destroying the work at each stage, this reflection itself must be understood as being incapable of isolating this potential at any one of its intermediary stages. It must be seen, in other words, as being unable to demonstrate how that which is formalized at any given stage of reflection can be directly related to the form of absolute "Klarheit und Deutlichkeit" defined by the "absolute Reflexion." In this sense, critical reflection can be said to constitute a process in which each particular act of negation and formalization is actualized only in its discrete singularity --without being explicitly informed by any projected, absolute unity or finality: "Denn nur graduell," as Benjamin states, "ist die Einheit des Einzelwerkes von der der Kunst... unterschieden"(86, emphasis added).

Irony, on the other hand --by virtue of its "eigentümliche Positivität-- can be understood as defining and protecting precisely that potentiality which exists throughout the reflective process (but which is only realized at the point of absolute reflection). In doing so, this irony can be understood as defining that which is inherent or common to all stages of reflection

--thus effectively establishing the unity and significance of the reflective process as a whole. Formal irony can be said to do this, furthermore, precisely in the sense that it is able (at least figuratively), to comprehend the two extreme points in the reflective process simultaneously in their sustained duplicity; and it is in this sense that this irony can be said to conform to conventional definitions of romantic irony.[22] Benjamin's description of this irony, it should be noted, culminates in the following dramatic and suggestive depiction --a depiction which appears to reinforce (but also in some way to exceed) the terms in which irony was explicated above:

Über [der] bestimmte[n] Form reißt die Ironie einen Himmel ewiger Form, die Idee der Formen, auf, die man die absolute Form nennen mag, und sie erweist das überleben des Werkes, das aus dieser Sphäre sein unzerstörbares Bestehen schöpft, nachdem die empirische form, der Ausdruck seiner isolierten reflexion, von ihr ver- zehrt wurde....Die[se] Ironi[e] ist gleichsam der Sturm, der den Vorhang vor der tranzendentalen Ordnung der Kunst aufhebt (86).

Such a vivid depiction of this irony --and such a dramatic foregrounding of its revelatory power-- can be described as charging this "Ironiebegriff" with a significance which exceeds the ostensible meaning assigned to it on the level of the dissertation's explicit content. It is also possible to suggest that such a semantic "excess" represents an extension of the meaning or significance of this concept into the implicit, connotative dimension of this text. And one could further propose that as such, this concept enters into suggestive proximity or perhaps even direct association with the similarly implicit thematics of "romantischer Messianismus" encoded in the dissertation's connotative content.

That such an association and suggestion is viable can perhaps be most effectively illustrated by examining briefly the points where the hidden thematic of history and the messianic rises --albeit only instantaneously-- to the denotative, explicit surface or level of Benjamin's dissertation. It is precisely such an examination that this paper now proposes to undertake. And it proposes to carry this out specifically in the hope not only of identifying the extended, connotative significance of irony, but also of indicating the nature and organization of the dissertation's implicit messianic thematic as a whole.

The first passage in which these terms appear is located within the Benjamin's prefatory "Einschränkungen zur Fragestellung" and has been discussed at outset of this paper.[23] However, it should be recalled that in this specific passage, Benjamin indicates that "romantischer Messianismus" is in fact implied in "Kunstkritik;" and that he also concedes that this matter cannot be examined within the confines of his dissertation.

At the second point where these terms arise --appearing in the middle of the dissertation's first half-- the particular term "Geschichte" appears in the specific context of a discussion of the "absolute" implied in the medium of reflection. Although this passage cannot be said to be completely equivocal in its implications, it is possible to point out that within it, Benjamin identifies the significant possibility of the "[S]ubstituier[ung]" (44) of the terms directly descriptive of the absolute implied in the reflective process: More specifically, Benjamin (in considering the various conceptual transformations occurring in Schlegel's career) states that this absolute is indeed at one point definable as "Kunst." He then proceeds to say that this definition or designation can substituted with any number of other determina-tions; and the one designation Benjamin underscores --albeit only obliquely-- is "Geschichte:"

Wenn die Kunst als das absolute Relfexionsmedium die systematische Grundkonzeption der Athenäumszeit ist, so findet sich diese durch andere Bezeichnungen sub- stituiert....Das Absolute erscheint bald als Bildung, bald als Harmonie, als Genie oder Ironie, als Religion, Organisation oder Geschichte. Und es soll gar nicht geleugnet werden, daß in anderen Zusammenhängen es wohl denkbar wäre, eine der anderen Bestimmungen --also nicht die Kunst sondern etwa die Geschichte-- jenem Absoluten, wofern nur sein Charakter als Re- flexionsmedium gewahrt bliebe, einzuzeichnen(44).

By thus suggesting a possible substitution of the terminology used to define the "Absolute" from that of "Kunst" --through "Genie," "Religion," etc.-- to that of "Geschichte," this passage can be said to imply the possibility of a terminological transposition comparable to the one described earlier in this paper: For it can be said that Benjamin --in proposing that the absolute can be determined as history-- makes the implicit suggestion that the entire apparatus of reflection implied in this absolute can be similarly described not in the romantic vocabulary of the "Kunstwerk" and its "Kritik," but in that of history and its interpretation. The precise way in which this transposition is to occur can perhaps be best illustrated by examining a further passage in which the implicit "messianic" thematic appears.

The third and apparently last point where this covert thematic emerges is located towards the end of the dissertation's last half, and is marked by the appearance of the phrase "romantischer Messi-anismus," as well as the word "Fortschritt." These terms appear in a context where Benjamin is speaking specifically of the pro-gressive nature --or, as Benjamin says, "die Progredibilität"-- of the reflective process. Benjamin states at this point that this "progressivity" itself constitutes an "Erfüllungsprozeß;" and that as such, he claims that it must be understood to unfold in a "zeitliche Unendlichkeit" which he describes specifically as being "medial und qualitativ" in character. Benjamin is careful to emphasize that it is precisely the "medial und qualitativ" character of this infinite temporality that ensures that the progressive nature of reflection is distinguished from the conventional notion of historical progress:

die Progredibilität [ist] durchaus nicht das, was unter dem modernen Ausdruck `Fortschritt' verstanden wird[.] Sie ist, wie das ganze Leben der Menschheit, ein unend- licher Erfüllungs-, und kein bloßer Werdeprozeß... eine mediale und qualitative...zeitliche Unendlichkeit (92).

In a footnote accompanying this passage, Benjamin explains that the one element which would ensure that this process is indeed "medial und qualitativ" --and thus also a human "Erfüllungsprozeß"-- is precisely "romantischer Messianismus:" "Dies [(ie. der mediale und qualitative Charakter der zeitlichen Unendlichkeit)] folgt aus dem romantischen Messainismus," as Benjamin says, "und kann hier nicht begründet werden"(92).

It is in this indirect, negative fashion that Benjamin can thus be said to indicate the way in which the reflective process is to be described specifically in the vocabulary of a similarly progressive, messianic historiography: For in describing the progressive nature of the reflective process as an "Erfüllungsprozeß ...wie das ganze Leben der Menschheit," Benjamin can be said to indicate that this process is specifically "temporal" and "historical" in its import and significance. Given such a suggestion, it can be further surmised that such a temporally-oriented reflective process might derive its content from a concrete, relative object which is itself historical in nature; and that it also might ultimately abstract from this object a universal and absolute form which is also historical in its significance. But of greatest importance is the question of how the messianic component --which would ensure that reflective process would at each stage be an "Erfüllungsprozeß"-- is itself to be articulated in terms of history and its interpretation. Of the various elements and operations described above as being constitutive of the reflective process, the one most directly and consistently comparable to this messianic element would seem to be "die Ironie der Form:" For the operation of this irony --like that of romantic messianism-- can be said to ensure that the process in which it is involved is indeed an "Erfüllungsprozeß;" and it can be said to do this simply through its preservation of the potentiality specific to the individual object --ensuring that it is ultimately incorporated and actualized (and in this sense, "fulfilled") in the absolute.

In order to properly illustrate how formal irony --and its positive, protective function-- can be understood as representing a displaced, transposed form of romantic messianism, it is necessary to leave the confines of Benjamin's dissertation --and to consider briefly how the messianic thematic is articulated in an explicitly historiographical terminology in Benjamin's "Thesen" "Über den Begriff der Geschichte" of 1939. Consequently, in its concluding pages, this essay will briefly examine this latter text --not to in an attempt to achieve an overview of its contents-- but simply to facilitate the isolation of a few fundamental points of analogy.

It is important to note that within these "Thesen" --and in the paralipomena accompanying them-- the specific term "messianisch" appears only sporadically. However, when these scattered references are considered concurrently, it becomes apparent that they point toward the presence of two distinct semantic values underlying this one term: Put very briefly, Benjamin --on the one hand-- speaks of "eine messianische Still-stellung des Geschehens," and of a "Splitter des Messianischen."[24] In each these two instances, the term can be said to designate a singular, eruptive moment --a fragmentary messianic instant which (as Benjamin himself says in one of these references) would be extracted "aus dem...Lauf der Geschichte."[25] On the other hand, Benjamin --in the paralipomena to the "Thesen"-- makes reference at one point to a specifically "messianisch[e] Idee der Universalgeschichte."[26] In formulating such a phrase, Benjamin can be said to use the term "messianic" --explicitly at this point and implicitly at others[27]-- to denote a positive notion of history as a total or unified progression. (This specific usage of the term "messianic" will be further illustrated below.)

If the messianic --in addition to these two divergent values or valencies-- is to be somehow understood as additionally fulfilling the positive, protective function earlier ascribed to irony, then it would have to be understood as carrying out this function in relation to both of these meanings: As operating (on the one hand) towards the preservation of a discrete, fragmentary moment of the past; and (on the other) as accomplishing this specifically in order that it may eventually be incorporated into an absolute, "erfüllte" universal history.

The various functions of this term --as well its relationship to many of those used earlier to describe romantic "Kritik"-- can be said to brought together and ramified in Benjamin's description of messianic historical "criticism" presented in the seventeenth of his "Geschichtsphilosophische Thesen." As such, it seems appro-priate to cite this specific thesis at some length below --using its comprehensive concision to bring this paper to its conclusion.

However, before this passage can be cited, it should be first noted that in it (as elsewhere in the "Thesen") Benjamin designates the specific agent through which the "messianic" process of preservation and fulfillment are to be realized as the "historisch-er Materialist" --and his statements in this passage are formulated specifically as a description of the historical materialist's task. It is important to further note that Benjamin begins this passage by speaking of what can be characterized as the historian's initial derivation --through a process of simultaneous destruction and preservation-- of a specific historical content. This content is designated in this context specifically as a "monad" --a figurative, Leibnizean "Kern" containing the singular potentiality of the concrete which is to be preserved through the efficacy of the messianic. And in the end, this messianic process appears ultimately to fulfill or absolutize this singular potentiality in the context of a larger, integral universality:

Der historische Materialist geht an einen geschichtlichen Gegenstand einzig und allein da heran, wo er ihm als Monade entgegentritt. In dieser Struktur erkennt er das Zeichen einer messainischen Stillstellung des Geschehens, anders gesagt, einer revolutionären Chance im Kampfe für die unterdrückte Vergangenheit. Er nimmt sie wahr, um eine bestimmte Epoche aus dem homogenen Verlauf der Geschichte herauszusprengen; so sprengt er ein bestimmtes Leben aus der Epoche, so ein bestimmtes Werk aus dem Le- benswerk. Der Ertrag seines Verfahrens besteht darin, daß im Werk das Lebenswerk, im Lebenswerk die Epoche und in der Epoche der gesamte Geschichtsverlauf aufbewahrt ist und aufgehoben.[28]

Just as the "Werk" is said to be the sublation of the "Lebenswerk" (and the "Epoche" that of the entire "Geschichtsverlauf"), so too can the monadic "Kern" isolated by the historical materialist itself be said to be similarly preserved and transformed --and fully realized in terms of a messianic "Universalgeschichte." Thus, (despite some conceptual and terminological differences) it is possible to see from Benjamin's "Thesen" that the messianic does indeed exist in intimate and suggestive correlation with "die Ironie der Form" presented twenty years earlier in Benjamin's dissertation.

In conclusion, it can be said that the implicit messianic thematic presented in Benjamin's Begriff der Kunstkritik in der deutschen Romatik manifests itself in what might be termed a "reflective historiography:" A historiographical methodology which, it must be emphasized, would operate in a manner predominantly retrospective and protective in nature --preserving the specificity of the historically concrete for an absolutization which (because of its emphatically hypothetical nature) would always remain beyond its conceptual grasp.

Footnotes

[1] Walter Benjamin, "Begriff der Kunstkritik in der Deutschen Romantik," Gesammelte Schriften, ed. Theodor W. Adorno and Gershom Scholem (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag 1980), p. 14. Please note that all subsequent quotations from this specific text are taken from this edition and will be noted within the body of the essay.

[2] This is the title given to the dissertation's first prefatory sub-section; see p. 11.

[3] Later in this introductory section, Benjamin states explicitly that his dissertation will deal specifically with Schlegel: "Als die romantische Theorie der Kunstkritik wird im folgenden diejenige Friedrich Schlegels dargestellt"(14).

[4] It should be noted that at the few moments in the dissertation where romantic messianism is referred to explicitly, Benjamin's remarks can be said to be essentially parenthetical in nature --or (in the case of the two references cited above) to be confined entirely to the dissertation's footnotes.

[4] Walter Benjamin, Briefe, ed. Gershom Scholem and Theodor W. Adorno (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1976), p. 108.

[5] Ibid., pp. 202-203.

[6] Ibid., p. 208.

[7] It is at this specific point that the first, immediately salient divergence of the epistemology of the romantics from that of Fichte can be identified. Benjamin himself expresses this in the following way: "Das Interesse an der Unmittelbarkeit der obersten Erkenntnis teilte Fichte mit den Frühromantikern. Ihr Kultus des Unendlichen, wie sie ihn auch in der Erkenntnistheorie ausprägen, trennte sie von ihm und gab ihrem Denken seine höchst eigentümliche Richtung" (25).

[8] More precisely, this progression must be understood as being one in which the change introduced by each successive stage or reflection would itself change in its magnitude: Specifically, any one reflection occurring in this process must be understood as being greater in its transformative magnitude or power than the reflection previous to it. Webster's Third New International Dictionary provides the following definition and illustration for the term "exponential:" "[It is] used especially in indicating variation in which one variable factor depends upon another variable factor (culture is said to grow in an exponential manner; and the number of inventions is a function of the size of the cultural base -F.H. Hankins)." (Webster's Third New International Dictionary (Springfield, Massachusetts: G. & C. Merriam Co., 1961), p. 208.)

[9] Webster's gives the following definition

of "asymptote," (and also provides the diagram reproduced on the right): "[A] straight line associated with a curve such that as a point P moves out

along an infinite branch of the curve the distance from the point P to the line approaches zero and the slope of the curve at P approaches the slope

of the line"(p. 136). Accordingly, the curve described in this definition could be said to schematize the progression of reflection, and the straight line can be understood as itself representing the absolute. As such, this curve --like the process of reflection itself-- would appear to approach ever more closely the absolute, but never become completely coextensive with it.

[10] It should be noted here that the "Darstellungform" --as well as the reflection giving it definition-- appear conspicuously and with especial frequency in Benjamin's specific description of formal irony (see p. 86; see below, p. 20).

[11] Benjamin's exact words at this point are as follows: "Ihre Aufgabe erfüllt die Kritik, indem sie, je geschlossener die Relfexion, je strenger die Form des Werkes ist, desto vielfacher und intensiver diese aus sich heraustreibt, die ursprüngliche Reflexion in einer höheren auflöst und so fortfärt"(73).

[12] See above, p. 10.

[13] One can note here that in the section of his dissertation entitled "Die Bedeutung der Reflexion bei den Frühromantikern," Benjamin himself speaks of an "Unendlichkeit des Zusammenhanges" (26) --saying that "es sollte in ihr [(dieser Unendlichkeit)] alles auf unendlich vielfache Weise... zusammenhängen."(26) He additionally indicates at this point that the way in which these elements are to "cohere" or interrelate is precisely "in der Vermittlung durch Reflexionen"(27). Benjamin also proceeds to explain that because each reflection must be understood as being "unmittelbar in sich"(26), the mediation provided by reflection can be further described as "eine Vermittlung durch Unmittelbarkeiten." "Friederich Schlegel kannte keine andere," Benjamin goes on to say, "und er spricht gelegentlich in diesem Sinne von dem `Übergang, der immer ein Sprung sein muß'"(27).

[14] It should be noted that the term "Medium" appears throughout Benjamin's discussion of both the specifically Fichtean and romantic modes of reflection. As early as page 38, for example, Benjamin insists on the "Einheit von Reflexion und Medialität," and characterizes reflection (citing a description from Novalis) as existing in a state of "`Selbstdurchdringung.'" A few pages later, Benjamin further describes the "Reflexions-medium" as a "ein stetige[r] mediale[r] Zusammenhang"(49); and later, as "ein Medium, welches den Zusammenhang der Formen in sich birgt und aus sich bildet"(111).

[15] Benjamin further describes "die mediale Natur des Absolutums"(37) in the following passage: "Die reflexion Konstituiert das Absolute, und sie konstituiert es als ein Medium. Auf den stetigen gleichformigen Zusammenhang im Absolutum...die man...als den Zusammenhang des Wirklichen...in den Graden seiner deutlichen Entfaltung zu interpretieren hat"(37). Benjamin also describes the "absolute Kunstform" further in the following way: "In d[em Medium] hängen alle Darstellungsformen stetig zusammen, gehen in einander über und vereinigen sich zur absoluten Kunstform"(87).

[16] See p. 87, where Benjamin makes the following assertion: "[Die] absolut[e] Kunstform...ist identisch...mit der Idee der Kunst."

[17] Benjamin speaks of the specific "Beziehung des einzelnen Werkes auf die Idee der Kunst" on page 73 of the dissertation.

[18] Benjamin's exact words at this point are as follows: "Sie [(die Ironie)] is an dieser Stelle einmal darum zu behandeln, weil in einem bestimmten Hinsicht mit d[en] objektiven Momenten seines [(Friedrich Schlegels)] Denkens...in einem engen Zusammenhang steht"(81).

[19] This is the case, of course, because of the infinite, asymptotic character of reflective "Pontenzierung."

[20] For Benjamin's description of "aboslute Relfexion," see pages 30-31 of his dissertation.

[21] See, for example, The Princeton Handbook of Poetic Terms, ed. Alex Preminger (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986), in which romantic irony is defined as giving "expression" to "the paradoxical nature" of such oppositions and polarities as the "absolute vs. relative, subjective vs. objective"(109).

[22] See above, p. 2.

[23] Walter Benjamin, "Über den Begriff der Geschichte," Gesammelte Schriften, I, 2, p. 704.

[24] Ibid., p. 703. For further description of this process of the "extraction" of the messianic moment, see below, pp. 29-30.

[25] Walter Benjamin, "Über den Begriff der Geschichte," "Anmerkungen," Gesammelte Schriften, I, 3, p. 1234.

[26] An example of a further, implicit reference can be found at another point in the paralipomena where Benjamin says the following about the notion of a "Universalgeschichte:" "Nicht jede Universalgeschichte muß reaktionär sein. Die Universalgeschichte ohne konstruktives Prinzip ist es. Das konstruktive Prinzip der Universalgeschichte erlaubt es, sie in den partiellen zu repräsen-tieren. Es ist mit andern Worten ein monadologisches. Es existiert in der Heilsgeschichte" (Benjamin, I, 3, p. 1234). Also, within the "Thesen" themselves, Benjamin speaks affirmatively of a historiographical method which would accomplish the "[A]ufheb[ung] und [A]ufbewahr[ung]" of "der gesamte Geschichtsverlauf"(Benjamin, p. I, 2, 703, emphasis added).

[27] Benjamin, I, 2, p. 703.

Bibliography

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Benjamin, Walter. "Über den Begriff der Geschichte." Gesammelte Schriften, I, 2; also I, 3.

Bullock, Marcus. "The Coming of the Messiah or the Stoic Burning

--Aspects of the Negated Text in Walter Benjamin and Friedrich Schlegel." The Germanic Review. Winter 1985, LX, 1. Pp. 2- 15.

Menninghaus, Winfried. Unendliche Verdoppelung: die frühromantische Grundlegung der Kunsttheorie im Begriff absoluter Selbst- reflexion. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1987. Pp. 7-71, 215- 223.